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III 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in the Utah Court 
Appeals pursuant to the provisions of UCA §78-2a-3. 
IV 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit any error of fat or law when it 
nied Mr. Harris' motion or an order to show cause? 
ii 
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of review; the 
legal issues are determined under a correctness standard. 
Anesthesiologist Associates of Ogden vs. St. Benedict 852 P.2d 1030 
(Utah App. 1993). The factual determinations are under a marshaling 
standard, abuse of discretion, Marshall vs. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508 
(Utah App. 1996); Breinholt vs. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 
1995); Child vs. Child 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998). 
2. Did the trial court commit any error of fact or law when it 
ruled the third parties not parties to the divorce proceeding between 
Mr. and Mrs. Harris could not litigate any claims in Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris divorce proceeding? 
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of review; the 
legal issues are determined under a correctness standard. 
Anesthesiologist Associates of Ogden vs. St. Benedict 852 P.2d 1030 
(Utah App. 1993). The factual determinations are under a marshaling 
standard, abuse of discretion, Marshall vs. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508 
(Utah App. 1996); Breinholt vs. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 
1995); Child vs. Child 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998). 
3. Is Mr. Harris entitled to the relief he seeks in this appeal? 
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of review; the 
legal issues are determined under a correctness standard. 
Anesthesioloaist Associates of Ogden vs. St. Benedict 852 P.2d 1030 
(Utah App. 1993) . The factual determinations are under a marshaling 
standard, abuse of discretion, Marshall vs. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508 
(Utah App. 1996); Breinholt vs. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 
iii 
1995); Child vs. Child 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998). 
V 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
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UCA§78-2a3) ii 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process 
necessary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
rb) appeals from the district court review of 
i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and 
ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12 1, 
c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a 
irst degree or capital felony, 
e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a 
rst degree felony or capital felony, 
f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or 
^rving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the 
mtence for a first degree or capital felony, 
$) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
ardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony, 
i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
mulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
> appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court 
) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may 
rtify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the 
>urt of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction 
i The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative 
)cedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings 
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Rule 12 URCP 
13 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve 
an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state 
and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state A party 
served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the 
service The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service 
of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless 
the order otherwise directs The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, 
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims 
in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action, 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served 
within ten days after the service of the more definite statement 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion (1) 
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, 
(4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party A motion making any of these defenses 
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted No defense or objection is waived by 
being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by 
further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) 
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to 
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings If, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, 
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of 
this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial 
v 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so 
vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party 
may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point 
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is 
not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive 
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of 
the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other 
motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not 
include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except 
as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to 
i claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the 
headings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the 
)arties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
tction. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the 
ight of any evidence that may have been received. 
i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion 
lade pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, 
r is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for 
3Sts and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the 
xirt of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking 
ith sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such 
aintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
:) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 
tys of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing 
e action. 
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lie 56. Summary judgment. 
• For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
:laratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the 
vi 
action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501 The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the trial of the action 
the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of 
the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, 
the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt 
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action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501 The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the trial of the action 
the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
3e made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
>how affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified 
:opies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
herewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
nterrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
irovided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
ut his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
hat there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
e entered against him 
) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
tat he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court 
iay refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
^positions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just 
) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of 
e affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, 
e court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
isonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's 
5S, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt 
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therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b), (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party, (4) the 
judgment is void, (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application, or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action 
Page 
Rule 33 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 6-7, 9, 11, 16,19, 21-23 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the 
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party The court may order that the damages be paid by the 
party or by the party's attorney 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion A party may 
request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 
10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper 
ix 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the 
party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded The order to 
show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten 
days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown The order to show cause may 
be part of the notice of oral argument 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing 
x 
VI ' 
:2JLJL! hMENTOFTHECASF 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a frivolous appeal, l i 1 ^ ! i \ Mr Harris, filed in bad 
r-iith, without any basis in fact or law, seeking to have the triad 
court's denial c i: hit m . i« i, 1 \ n, -^ rl^ r to show cause reversed. Mr. 
Harris is also seeking to have the trial court's order stiikinu the 
redundant an J ] ieviousi\ li» iqated claims of Mr. Harris concerning the 
transfer and value of assets to Mrs. Harris reversal Hit i hud ly, 
Mi IHI i i i SHe4 inq to have the trial court's order striking the 
improper claims by third parties, wh <^*"' | ir1 < ^ js to the divorce 
proceeding between Mr. and Mrs. Harris reversed and Mr. Harris is 
asking this Court to direc. .: • : * • *~rer summary judgment 
in his favor on his motion for an order to show cause. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT • 
On December 20, 2000, Mr. Harris filed, a motion fur .in "c^r to 
show CdUbt1 iilJu'UiJi'i thiii Mr s. Harris had received monies for assets 
she was awarded as her share of marital property MI II<-] divorce 
proceed!nq with Mr. Harris that was in excess of what she was awarded 
in the divorce proceeding, Mi , Hem is a i so s znqht to have claims of 
I" bird parties, not parties to the divorce proceeding between Mr. din J 
Mrs. Harris litigated iiv^rM^ pr ^ porting. Mrs. Harris filed a 
Motion to ftrike Mr. Harris motion tor an order to show cauot because 
Mr. Harris'" clai ins coi icernj i lg assets and amounts distributed to Mxs. 
-1-
Harris had previously been litigated at a May 31, 2000, evidentiary 
hearing on Mr. Harris' contempt. 
The trial court stuck all of Mr. Harris' claims but one and 
denied his motion for an order to show cause on that claim. 
C 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Harris filed for divorce against Mrs. Harris September 
20, 1995. (Record at page(s) 2). 
2. By Stipulation of the parties, Norman/Loebbecke and 
Associates (hereinafter, "Norman/Loebbecke") of Salt Lake City, was 
appointed to do an evaluation of the marital assets of Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris. (Record at page(s) 270-273). 
3. Norman/Loebbecke, was to perform the evaluation from 
Information provided to them by the parties. (Record at page(s) 270-
>73) . 
4. Norman/Loebbecke subsequently issued a report that listed 
rr. and Mrs. Harris' marital assets and liabilities and the values of 
he various assets. Based on this information, the court found that 
he net value of Mr. and Mrs. Harris' marital estate was $975,273.00. 
Record at page(s) 629) 
5. The Court used the net value after taxes as found by Brad 
Dwnsend of Norman/Loebbecke in making its property distribution. The 
)urt incorporated a Schedule A, Proposed Marital Asset and Liability 
.stribution, "as per Craig Harris," prepared by Norman/Loebbecke into 
s Supplementary Findings of Fact and Supplementary Decree of Divorce 
-2-
when making its property ui ,ii. L it ut irTi . II^CTC! at tageis) 624) 
t>, Mr, Harris failed and refused to abide by the provisions of 
the Supplementary Decree it hi" r >-> nrni refused to transfer to Mrs. 
Harris the assets she had been awarded by the trial court as 'her share 
of tl le mar i ta ] proper* in the divorce proceeding with Mr. Harris. 
Because Mr. Harris failed and refused to transfer L. Hn^. Harris tti^  
assets she was awarded by the trial court, Mrs. Harris filed a motion 
for an order to show cause, which was granted, nth .m evidentialy 
hearing was held on the order to show cause on May 31, 2001. (Record 
at page{s) 79b). 
At the May 31, 2001, evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
found Mr. ttditi; in < '< »nt empi , (l<ecord n i paqe(s) 901) 
8 At the May Jl, 2on] , evidentiary hearing, Mrs, Hair i.s 
pieseiited ov i' lericr -•*rH 1 I pstimony concerning the values of the assets 
she was awarded by the trial court as her portion >0 the ninr i tal 
property and the amount of money in various accounts she was awarded 
as a part of her portion of the rnant J 1 fULp^it , . * -ge(s) 
900-901) 
Thr Lrirjl (.'mil t dtcepted fdie ev idenr*-* and testimony offered 
by Mrs. Harri s and ordered Mr. Harris to transfer to Mrs. Har ris the 
assets dii'J sotKihl t» Mi , Harris in her Motion for an Order to 
Show Cause. (Record at page(s) 900-901) 
1". Mi . Nrji'ris did not oLiect to the substance or form, of the 
order memorializing Mr. Harris' contempt anh lequii m.] Hi fl,-u i i :- *• i 
transfer to Mrs. Harris the assets and monies sought by Mrs. Harris in 
her Motion for an Order to Show Cause, bi it rather 1 le attempted to make 
a part of the record documents specifically excluded by the trial 
court from the May 31, 2001, evidentiary hearing by attaching them to 
a document entitle Objection. (Record at page(s) 914-971) 
11. Mr. Harris did not file a motion under Rule 50 URCP 
challenging the transfer of the assets and monies to Mrs. Harris. 
Likewise, Mr. Harris did not file a motion under Rule 60 URCP 
challenging the validity of the transfer of assets or monies to Mrs. 
Harris pursuant to the trial court's finding of contempt on the part 
of Mr. Harris. (Record at page(s) 12-95-1296) 
12. On December 20, 2000, Mr. Harris filed a motion for an order 
to show cause a memorandum in support of the motion and a notice of 
hearing on the order to show cause. (Record at page(s) 1097-1246) 
13. No order to show cause was ever issued with respect to Mr. 
Harris' motion for an order to show cause. (Record at page(s) 1285-
1295) 
14. In his motion for an order to show cause, Mr. Harris again 
attempted to litigate the distribution of assets to Mrs. Harris, the 
value of those assets and to pursue claims of his brother, sons, Aid 
Equipment and some unknown person or entity against Mrs. Harris. 
(Record at page(s) 1097-1244) 
15. Mr. Harris and his counsel had been repeatedly told by the 
:rial court that Mrs. Harris was awarded assets not a dollar value and 
:hat Mr. Harris could not litigate the claims of third parties in the 
iivorce proceeding with Mrs. Harris. (Record at page(s) 628, 1282) 
16. Because Mr. Harris was again seeking to re-litigate the 
ralidity of the transfer of assets to Mrs. Harris, seeking again to 
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argue that Mr s, I lar ris \ /"as a\ warded a do] ] ar value in specific assets, 
rather than the assets themselves and seeking yet another time to 
litigaU Lhtr Iciiiii/ i I riif i f'i't i ^ ,s iii the divorce proceeding, Mrs. 
Harris filed a Motion to Strike Mr. Harris' motion for an order to 
show "ause. ^ r n r i h\ paqe(si 1247-1259* 
] 7. A hearing was held on February m , n n, i M , n u i L; ' 
motion for and order to show cause and on Mrs. Harris Motion to Strike 
the redundant claims oi Mr. Harris. uec r j i page o~ » 1 M ~ - i 2 r 9 ) 
1 H . At the February 14, 2001 hearing, the trial court struck all 
of Mi . Harris" c J u 1111;^  • nii i :iii Ied :i i I 1 :i :i ni<sni« > r anc1iim in support of his 
motion for an order to show cause and again informed Mr, Harris and 
h i s c > j u i L s e 1 1 11 a t Mi , } l-i r J i ,; c o \ i ] d n o t 1 i t i gate the claims of his 
brother, sons, Aid Equipment and, some unidentified person or ei iti t^ 
11 I 111 11 vo r r > p i . ir-PPi j j n <3 wi th M r s . H a r r i s . The t ria 1 c o u r t 
reiterated for the nth time that Mrs. Ha rr i s wa s aw a rde d spe ci f ic 
asspfs, not dollar value in assets. The trial court further informed 
Mr. Harris and his counsel that the valu^,. ^f tl le assets ai id propri ety 
of the transfer of those assets had been litigated and establisl: led at 
the June runu
 ev i« lent j .-u y heating HI id Uwi! the court would not revisit 
that ruling. (Record at page(s) 1327-1330) 
I1" TL I i in I i m l then denied Mr. Harris' motion for an order 
to show cause with respect to personal property allegedly La ken by 
Mrs. Han't-", in denying Mr. Harris' motion on that single claim, all 
of the other claims having been previously sLiicken, the i i i-H > ui n: 1: 
made a factual determination that i t would be useless to have an 
evidentiary hearing on that claim because the]*- wa ip 11 . t M| the 
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property, allegedly taken by Mrs. Harris, previously filed with the 
court, that would enable the court to determine if in fact anything 
Mr. Harris had previously claimed as personal property had been taken. 
(Record at page(s) 1327-1330) 
20. Subsequent to the entry of the order on Mr. Harris' motion 
for an order to show cause, Mr. Harris filed the instant appeal. 
(Record at page(s) 1408) 
VII 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY ERROR OF FACT OR LAW WHEN IT 
DENIED MR. HARRIS' MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR WHEN IT 
STRUCK MATTERS FROM MR. HARRIS' MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
THAT HAD BEEN DETERMINED AT A PREVIOUS EVIDENTIARY HEARING. THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, MR. HARRIS' APPEAL 
SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED AND MRS. HARRIS SHOULD BE AWARDED HER 
DOUBLE HER COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN RESPONDING TO MR. 
HARRIS' APPEAL THAT IS A PER SE VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
POINT I 
MR. HARRIS APPEAL IS TOTALLY DEVOID OF ANY LOGIC FACTS OR LAW . THE 
APPEAL IS SO INCOHERENT THAT IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO RESPOND THE 
INCOHERENT RAMBLING AND LUDICROUS ASSERTIONS. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MR. 
HARRIS. 
B. AT THE HEARING ON MRS. HARRIS' MOTION TO STRIKE, THE TRIAL 
COURT CORRECTLY AND PROPERLY STRUCK THE REDUNDANT CLAMS OF MR. 
HARRIS. 
C. MR HARRIS WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO APPEAL THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: MR. 
HARRIS CLAIM THE HE DID NOT RECEIVE THE PERSONAL PROPERTY HE WAS 
\WARDED IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING WHEN HE DECLINED TO HAVE THE 
TRIAL COURT HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THAT ISSUE. 
D. MR. HARRIS' APPEAL IS SO TOTALLY DEVOID ON ANY FACTS OR LOGIC 
THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO RESPOND ASCERTAIN WHAT HE IS 
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ASSERTING 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PEOPLE AND/OR ENTITIES NOT 
PARTIES TO THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING BETWEEN MR. AND MRS. HARRIS COI I I) 
NOT SEEK ANY RELIEF FROM THE COURT AGAINST MRS. HARRIS IN THEIR 
DIVORCE PROCEEDING 
A. PEOPLE OR FN H TIES NOT PARTIES TO A DIVORCE PROCEEDING CANNOT 
HAVE THEIR CLAIMS LITIGATED IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
II. MR HARRIS WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE MA\ fiA\ t .. vi> > o APPEAL THE 
I RIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHEN HE 
TOLD THE COURT THAT HE WITHDREW THE CLAIM FOR Kn.HT TO THIRD 
PARTIES. 
POINT III 
MU. IIAIclcIS IS N< * i i IN i i i I FT) TO THE RELIEF HE SEEKS FROM THIS COURT. 
POINT IV 
MR. HARRIS APPEAL IS A PER SE VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
\PPFI LATE PROCEDURE, FILED FOR THE PURPOSES OF HARASSING MRS. HARRIS 
-TRF VSE THE COST OF LITIGATION TO HER. 
VII 
ARGUMENT 
MIL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY ERROR OF FACT OR LAW WHEN IT 
DENIED MR. HARRIS' MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR WHEN IT 
STRUCK MATTERS FROM MR. HARRIS' MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
THAT HAD BEEN DETERMINED AT A PREVIOUS EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
POINT I 
MR. HARRIS APPEAL IS TOTALLY DEVOID OF ANY LOGIC FACTS OR LAW . . HE 
APPEAL IS SO INCOHERENT THAT IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO RESPOND 1 HE 
INCOHERENT RAMBLING AND LUDICROUS ASSERTIONS. 
The assertions set forth in Mr. Harris brief are so incoherent 
and ludicrous that it is nearly impossible to respond the meaningless 
rambling contained in Mr. Harris' brief. Nonetheless, Mrs. Harris 
will attempt to respond to what she believes are the arguments Mr. 
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Harris and his counsel are attempting to make. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MR. 
HARRIS. 
Contrary to the inane, spurious and disingenuous assertions of 
Mr. Harris and his counsel, the trial court did not enter summary 
judgment against Mr. Harris. There was no motion for summary judgment 
before the trial court on which it could enter summary judgment 
against Mr. Harris. The February 14, 2001 hearing was on Mr. Harris' 
"Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Related Matters'' 
(hereinafter, "Order to Show Cause") and on Mrs. Harris' Motion to 
Strike. 
The trial court correctly and properly struck all of the claims 
set forth in Mr. Harris' Order to Show Cause, with the exception of 
Mr. Harris' assertion that he did not receive certain personal 
property. Those claims were stricken because those matters had been 
previously litigated at the May 31, 2000 evidentiary hearing or 
because the claims involved third parties who were not parties to the 
divorce proceeding between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. (Record at page(s) 
1327-1330) 
The trial court denied Mr. Harris' motion for an order to show 
cause with respect to personal property alLegedly taken by Mrs. 
Harris. In denying Mr. Harris' motion on that single claim, the trial 
court made a factual determination that it would be useless to have an 
evidentiary hearing on that claim because there was no list of the 
oroperty, allegedly taken by Mrs. Harris, previously filed with the 
^ourt, that would enable the court to determine if in fact anything 
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I li Har r i s I ia :i f r e^ n oi isly claimed as personal property had been taken. 
(Record at page(s) 1384) 
T'li^  d^n i :•< I < f Mr. Harris' Order to Show Cause and the court'' s 
granting of M r s . Harris Motion to Strike does not coi 1 stitute a gr ai 11 
of summary iudqment and any assertion that it does is a spurious and 
specious argument at best. M i . Harris 1 1 as i 1 ot , and cannot, ci te this 
Court to any authority declaring that a denial of an order to si: low 
cause 01 giciiiLiiig d muliuri w strike i s tantamount to a grant of 
sumiria r y j udgment. 
MI Hdri i' r lie 1 t i i -\~;unsel's assertion that the trial court 
granted, much less, improperly granted summary judgment m iauii rf 
Mr s, Harris i :- a deliberate, knowing and wil Iful misrepresentation to 
this Court and is a per se violation ut Pule i :M a -t tlu- ntah 1'uJes 
of Appellate Procedure. 
o. ^ i IriL HEARING ON MRS. HARRIS"" MOTION TO SI RIKE. THE TRIAL 
COURT CORRECTLY AND PROPERLY STRUCK THE REDUNDANT CLAMS OF 
MR. HARRIS. 
; . . • on Mr. H a r r i s ' o r d e r t o show 
c a u s e and Mrs . H a r r i s Mot ion t o S t r i k e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y and 
propyl I
 ( ^"Mi'-'k t h e r e d u n d a n t c l a i m s of Mr. H a r r i s r e g a r d i n g t h e 
v a l u e s and amounts of t h e a s s e t s awarded t o HI , i-un i if in im ii T-,rr^ 
p r o c e e d i n g w i t h Mr. H a r r i s , (Record a t p a g e ( s ) 1327-1330) At t h e 
e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g on Mr. ika i i; * . , I 'in I I I il m l 
s p e c i f i c a l l y e n t e r e d r u l i n g s on t h e v a l u e s of a s s e t s awarded t o Mrs . 
H a r r i s i n tht. u . JLCV p i u e e e d i i r j wi th Mr . IKirt i;». 
Evidence and testimony concerning the values of the various 
.9. 
assets was presented to the trial court and the trial court entered a 
ruling and order concerning the value of those assets. Mr. Harris did 
not appeal that ruling. Therefore, it stands even if other portions 
of the trial court's order should be reversed. All rulings not 
appealed from remain in full effect and force even if other portions 
of a judgment are reversed or modified. See: D'Aston v. D'Aston, 844 
p.2d 345 (Ut App. 1992). 
If Mr. Harris did not agree with the trial court's findings 
concerning the amounts and values awarded to Mrs. Harris during the 
May 31, 2000 evidentiary hearing, he was obligated to file a motion 
under Rule 59 URCP or a motion under Rule 60(b) URCP. (Record at 
page(s) 1329) Mr. Harris did not file any motion under Rule 59 URCP 
or 60(b) URCP. Therefore, he was estopped from attempting to re-
litigate any assertions that Mrs. Harris received more in assets than 
she was awarded by the trial court. (Record at page(s) 1333-1358) 
The trial court also properly struck the claims of third parties 
not parties to the divorce proceeding from Mr. Harris' Order to Show 
Cause. This issue is addressed in detail in Point II of this brief. 
Because Mr. Harris and his counsel were improperly and unlawfully 
attempting to re-litigate the trial court's previous determination and 
award of assets to Mrs. Harris, the trial court correctly struck any 
claims concerning the distribution of assets from Mr. Harris "Motion 
Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Related Matters." (Record at page(s) 
1327-1330) Mr. Harris', and his counsel's, assertions that the trial 
court improperly struck Mr. Harris' redundant, spurious and 
disingenuous claims to re-litigate the values of the assets awarded 
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Mrs . H a r r i s , ib ^ > i e i i n e r a t " , K\ wina -Mil w i l f u l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o 
t h i s Cour t and i s a p e r se v i o l a t i o n of Rule 33(a) of t h e -Utah Ru les 
ut Appe1i a t e i ro c ed u r *j, 
C. MR. HARRIS WAIVED AN \ Ki^H 1 HE MA\ HAVE HAD I O APPEAL I HE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: 
MR. HARRIS CLAIM THAT HE DID NOT RECEIVE THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
HE WAS AWARDED IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING WHEN HE DECLINED TO 
HAVE THE TRIAL COURT HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THAT ISSUE. 
i vt 11 ie E 'ebrI iar y ] 1, 2 0 01 h e a r i ng on Mr . H a r r i s ' mot ion for an 
o r d e r t o show c a u s e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t cou ld n,ML 
grant Mr ,r rttoti on fo r an o r d e r t o show c a u s e w i t h r e s p e c t t o 
h i s c l a i m t h a t he d i d not r e c e i v e c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y t e e / u i s e 
flip t r i a l c o u r t had no l i s t of t h e i t e m s of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y Mr. 
H a r r i s was t h e n c l a i m i n g he d id 11< »L l ece iv* , i k m i . l o jnqe(s) 
1284,36-37) In response to the trial court's assertion that it could 
not determine w! lat property Mi I larr :i s was cl ai m ing he did not 
receive, Mr. Harris and his counsel told the trial court that they did 
IIL'L wnii riii i 'l'l^ntiat'" hear inn on that issue. (Record at pageis) 
1284, 56) The most Mr. Harris would, have been entitled on his ru- • L i - »i i 
foi: ai I order to s 1 Iox i cai Ise i s an evidentiary hearing on whether or not 
Mrs . Harris was in contempt of the trial court's orders Lot dlh-gedly 
failing to qive Mr. Harris certain items of personal property he 
c l a i m e d he d i d n o t r e c e i v e . By wci i u i i ho upp o Min i i ' t . h/ivp an 
evidentiary on his cJaim that Mrs. Harris failed to permit him. to have 
certain, items wi personal pj • >p* i t.y, Mi , IMrri,c \<M i vpd any right he may 
have had to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for an. order 
t o show cciu: » ''ii i t i i i i i i i in iiM i M* i . now e s t o p p e d t o c l a i m t h a t t h e 
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trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it denied 
his motion for an order to show cause. 
Mr. Harris' appeal of this claim is simply a frivolous and 
malicious act on the part of Mr. Harris and his attorney to increase 
the cost of litigation to Mrs. Harris. Therefore, Mr. Harris appeal 
should be summarily dismissed and Mrs. Harris should be awarded double 
her costs and attorney's fees incurred m responding to this appeal. 
D. MR. HARRIS' APPEAL IS SO TOTALLY DEVOID ON ANY FACTS OR LOGIC 
THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO RESPOND ASCERTAIN WHAT HE IS 
ASSERTING OR TO RESPOND TO HIS INCOHERENT RAMBLING. 
In h i s f i n a l p a r a g r a p h u n d e r Poan t 1 of h i s a r g u m e n t , Mr. H a r r i s 
c l a i m s he i s e n t i t l e d t o have t h i s Cour t r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
d e n i a l of h i s Order t o Show Cause and have a judgment on t h e p l e a d i n g s 
e n t e r e d m h i s f a v o r . For some i n e x p l i c a b l e r e a s o n Mr. H a r r i s and h i s 
c o u n s e l have c o n c l u d e d t h a t Mr. H a r r i s i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment on t h e 
p l e a d i n g s when Mr. H a r r i s f i l e d a mo t ion f o r an o r d e r t o show c a u s e . 
They do n o t e x p l a i n how t h e y came t o t h i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o n c l u s i o n . 
They do n o t c i t e any a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y p r o p o s i t i o n . 
They s i m p l y s t a t e "Once Bonnie decided to not meet the requirements of Rule 4-501, Craig 
was entitled to "Judgment on he Pleadings" in his favor " (Sic) However, t h r e e 
p a r a g r a p h s p r e c e d i n g t h e i r a s s e r t i o n t h a t "Craig was entitled to "Judgment on he 
Pleadings" in his favor..", Mr. H a r r i s and h i s c o u n s e l a s s e r t t h a t "Craig's motion 
met all of the requirements of Rule 40501(2) "Motions for Summary Judgment", and on page 11 
of h i s b r i e f , Mr. H a r r i s a s s e r t s "Under the facts of the case Craig was entitled to 
Bnef of Appellant, page 14, T 5 
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summary judgment in his favor on his motion. "-
Mr. Harris and his counsel cannot decide if they are asking this 
Court to instruct the trial court to enter summary judgment in their 
favor or judgment on the pleadings in their favor. But no matter 
which option they choose, they still have not and cannot explain to 
this Court how and why they are entitled to either summary judgment or 
judgment on the pleadings when all they filed was a motion for an 
order to show cause. Even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Harris' 
assertions contained a modicum of fact, law or reason, the most Mr. 
Harris would be entitled to is to have the trial court issue an order 
to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Harris' motion 
for an order to show cause. Mr. Harris is not entitled to have any 
type of judgment entered in his favor based on his motion for an order 
to show cause. 
Mr. Harris and his counsel also make the ridiculous assertion 
that Mrs . Harris' i(Motwn to Strike must be interpreted as a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings/'3 Mr. Harris and his counsel apparently have come to the 
ludicrous conclusion that because Mrs. Harris did not cite any cases, 
rules or statutes in her Motion to Strike, her Motion to Strike has to 
be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12 
URCP. This amazing conclusion and novel legal ruling by Mr. Harris 
and his counsel is curiously not supported by any citation to any case 
law, any statutes, any codes, any rules or any other type of 
2 
Appellant's Brief, page 11,14 
Appellant's Brief, page 13,12 
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authority. Mr. Harris and his counsel have not, and cannot, cite this 
Court to any authority declaring that a motion to strike becomes a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings because no specific rule, statute 
or case is cited in the motion to strike. Such an assertion is 
totally ridiculous. 
Mr. H a m s ' and his counsel ' s asse r t ions tha t Mrs. Har r i s ' "Motion 
to Strike must be interpreted as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings "" 1 s made even mo r e 
c u r i o u s by t h e i r l a t e r a s s e r t i o n t h a t "The substance of Bonnie's Motion to Strike 
must be interpreted as a Motion for Summary Judgment "5 Well a t l e a s t Mr. H a r r i s and 
his counsel are cons i s t en t . They asse r t tha t Mr. Har r i s ' motion for 
an order to show cause i s both a motion for judgment on the pleadings6 
and a motion for summary judgment.7 Likewise, Mr. Harris and his 
counsel a s se r t tha t Mrs. Har r i s ' Motion to Str ike i s both a motion for 
summary judgment8 and a motion for judgment on the pleadings . 0 
The remainder of Mr. Harris argument contained in Point 1 of his 
Brief is so incoherent that it is impossible to even attempt to 
respond to it. It is devoid of any logic or coherent reasoning. 
The only things that are clear about Mr. Harris' appeal is that 
it is not based in any fact, law or legal reasoning and that Mr. 
Appellant s Bnef, page 13, 1 2 
Appellant's Bnef, page 14, 1 1 
Appellant s Bnef, page 14,1 5 
Appellant's Bnef, page 11,14 
Appellant s Bnef, page 14,11 
Q 
Appellant's Bnef, page 13, % 4 
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Harris and his counsel filed this appeal in bad faith for the purposes 
of harassing Mrs. Harris and to increase the cost of litigation to 
her. Mr. Harris' appeal of the trial court's ruling is a per se 
violation of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Mr. Harris' appeal was filed without any basis in fact for law. 
Mr. Harris and his counsel have not, and cannot, cite this Court to 
any fact, statute, rule, or case law that supports their frivolous 
appeal of this issue. Because Mr. Harris and his counsel's appeal is 
frivolous, Mrs. Harris should be awarded double her costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in responding to this frivolous and bad faith 
appeal, as provided. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PEOPLE AND/OR ENTITIES NOT 
PARTIES TO THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING BETWEEN MR. AND MRS. HARRIS COULD 
NOT SEEK ANY RELIEF FROM THE COURT AGAINST MRS. HARRIS IN THEIR 
DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
A. PEOPLE OR ENTITIES NOT PARTIES TO A DIVORCE PROCEEDING CANNOT 
HAVE THEIR CLAIMS LITIGATED IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
Mr. Harris and his counsel falsely and speciously represent to 
this Court that the case of D'Aston v. D'Aston, supra, holds that a 
third party not a party to a divorce proceeding can seek and obtain 
relief from a court in a divorce proceeding. That assertion is 
blatant misrepresentation of the facts and the law as applied in 
D'Aston v. D'Aston. The facts of D'Aston v. D'Aston, and the law 
applied therein, are inapplicable to the facts of this case. There is 
nothing in D'Aston v. D'Aston that holds or remotely suggests that 
people or entities not parties to a case may obtain any relief 
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whatsoever in a case. In D'Aston v. D'Aston, Bruno D'Aston claimed he 
was in possession of certain coins and silver bullion by virtue of a 
consignment agreement with Michael Graham and Al Schaefer, Dorothy 
D'Aston and her son Eryck D'Aston allegedly stole those coins and 
silver bullion from Bruno D'Aston. 
During the trial of the case, Bruno D'Aston presented evidence 
and testimony from several witnesses verifying the consignment of 
coins and bullion from both Michael Graham and Al Schaefer. Based on 
the evidence and testimony presented by Bruno D'Aston, the trial court 
awarded Bruno D'Aston possession of the coins and silver bullion he 
had on consignment from Michael Graham and Al Schaefer. 
The D'Aston court did not award Michael Graham and/or Al Schaefer 
possession of the coins and silver bullion. Neither Michael Graham 
nor Al Schaefer asked the D'Aston court to award to them, or return to 
them, the coins and bullion they had consigned to Bruno D'Aston. 
Neither Michael Graham nor Al Schaefer sought any relief from the 
D'Aston court. 
In the instant matter, Mr. Harris does not claim that he was in 
possession of anything belonging to his sons, brother or Aid Equipment 
by virtue of any assignment, consignment, bail, receivership, loan, or 
other type of agreement whereby he would be entitled to custody and 
control over anything allegedly belonging to any third party. In his 
complaint, Mr. Harris did not seek to have anything allegedly 
belonging to any third party returned to him or claim. Nor did Mr. 
Harris claim he was in possession of anything allegedly belong to any 
third party. 
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The trial court correctly ruled that persons or entities not a 
party to the divorce proceeding between Mr. and Mrs. Harris, i.e., Mr. 
Harris' brother, sons and Aid Equipment, did not have standing to seek 
any relief from the court m the divorce proceeding. Mr. Harris has 
not, and cannot, cite this Court to any authority that permits a trial 
court to grant relief to people or entities that are not parties to 
the action pending before the court. 
Mr. Harris' brother, sons and Aid Equipment were not parties to 
the divorce proceeding between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. The trial court 
correctly determined it did not have the authority to provide Mr. 
Harris' brother, sons and Aid Equipment with any type of relief in the 
divorce proceeding between Mr. and Mrs. Harris and it so ruled. 
B. MR HARRIS WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO APPEAL THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
WHEN HE TOLD THE COURT THAT HE WITHDREW THE CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
TO THIRD PARTIES. 
At the February 14, 2001 hearing Mr. Harris' counsel specifically 
represented to the trial court that Mr. Harris was withdrawing any 
clam of any third party with respect to Mr. Harris' motion for an 
order to show cause. Mr. Harris counsel stated: 
With respect to Respondent Iv second argument that the Petitioner is not attempting— 
where am I here?--Respondent is arguing that Petitioner is attempting to litigate the 
alleged claims of non-parties to this action. That, again, is not the case. If that is in any 
way alleged in the documents, and I'm not sure it is, then I will withdraw that, because I 
completely understand. I actually came into this after the order to show cause had been 
filed. And if that's the case, I understand that argument. 
(Emphasis added) (record at page(s) 1284, page 15) 
Having withdrawn any claim of third parties with respect to his 
motion for an order to show cause, Mr. Harris is estopped from 
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asserting any error on the part of the trial court for failing to 
issue and order to show cause relative to any such third parties- Mr. 
Harris cannot withdraw his frivolous claim for third parties and then 
claim on appeal that the trial court erred for allowing him to 
withdraw the claim. 
Mr. Harris and his counsel's appeal of the trial court's ruling 
on this issue is a per se violation of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Mr. Harris is appealing this issue without any 
basis in fact for law for the appeal. Mr. Harris and his counsel have 
not, and cannot, cite this Court to any fact, statute, rule, or case 
law that supports their frivolous appeal of this issue. 
POINT III 
MR. HARRIS IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF HE IS SEEKING FROM THIS COURT. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that any of Mr. Harris' claims of error 
on the part of the trial court are true, Mr. Harris is not entitled to 
the relief he seeks from this Court. Mr. Harris is asking this Court 
to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion for an order to show 
cause and enter summary judgment in his favor on his motion for an 
order to show cause.10 
Again, assuming, arguendo, that any of Mr. Harris' claims of 
error on the part of the trial court are true, the most he would be 
entitled to from this Court is to have the trial court grant his 
lotion for an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to 
letermine if Mrs. Harris is in contempt of court for allegedly 
Appellant's Brief, page 17, ^  1 under "Relief Sought " 
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violation of any order of the trial court. There is no circumstance 
under which Mr. Harris is entitled to summary judgment on a motion for 
an order to show cause. Mr. Harris and his counsel have not, and 
cannot, cite this Court to any authority supporting Mr. Harris' 
assertion that his motion for an order to show cause somehow became a 
motion for summary judgment. Nor has Mr. Harris or his counsel cited 
this Court to any authority supporting Mr. Harris assertion that the 
trial court's denial of his motion for an order to show cause in any 
way whatsoever entitles him to have this Court direct the trial court 
to enter summary judgment in Mr. Harris' favor. Such an assertion 
defies all logic and reason. 
Mr. Harris' request to have summary judgment entered in his favor 
on his motion for an order to show cause is just more evidence that 
Mr. Harris' appeal is nothing more than an attempt to further harass 
Mrs. Harris and to increase the costs of litigation to her. Mr. 
Harris' appeal and his request to have summary judgment entered in his 
favor on his motion for an order to show cause is a per se violation 
of Rule 33 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and both Mr. Harris and 
his counsel should be appropriately and severely sanctioned for both 
filing the appeal and for seeking relief for which Mr. Harris is not 
entitled. 
POINT IV 
MR. HARRIS APPEAL IS A PER SE VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FILED FOR THE PURPOSES OF HARASSING MRS. HARRIS 
AND TO INCREASE THE COST OF LITIGATION TO HER. 
Mr. Harris and his counsel filed this appeal in bad faith for the 
purposes of harassing Mrs. Harris and to increase the cost of 
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litigation to her. Mr. Harris' appeal is not based in any fact or 
law. 
Mr. Harris previously told Mrs. Harris that unless she accepted 
his settlement offer he would fight her in court until she spent every 
cent received in the divorce settlement to pay attorney's fees. 
(Record at page(s) 1301-1306) Throughout their divorce proceeding and 
throughout the appeal process, Mr. Harris has kept that promise and 
has done everything possible to increase the cost of litigation to 
Mrs. Harris. 
Mr. Harris filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. Harris' appeal in case 
No. 200037-CA, falsely claiming that Mrs. Harris had not timely filed 
her notice of appeal and had not timely filed her docketing statement 
and/or her brief.11 Now, Mr. Harris his doing it again with this 
frivolous appeal in this case. 
Mr. Harris' appeal of his claim on behalf of third parties, and 
his assertion that the trial court coitimitted error in not granting his 
motion for an order to show cause after he had withdrawn the claim on 
behalf of those third parties, is beyond belief. Mr. Harris appeal of 
this issue is proof beyond any doubt that Mr. Harris and his counsel 
are fulfilling Mr. Harris' promise to fight Mrs. Harris in court until 
she spent every cent received in the divorce settlement to pay 
attorney's fees. 
Mr. Harris and his counsel's appeal of this issue is more than 
frivolous, it is malicious. Because Mr. Harris appeal is frivolous 
A copy of Mr Hams' Motion to Dismiss filed in case No 200037-CA is included m the Addendum to this Brief 
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and malicious, Mrs. Harris should be awarded double her costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in responding to this frivolous and bad faith 
appeal, as provided in Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Mr. Harris appeal is frivolous and is a per se violation of Rule 
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal was filed in 
bad faith, without any basis in fact or law, for the purposes of 
harassing Mrs. Harris and to increase the cost of litigation to her. 
Because Mr. Harris and his counsel's appeal is frivolous and 
malicious, this Court should affirm the trial court's rulings granting 
Mrs. Harris' Motion to Strike and denying Mr. Harris' Motion for an 
Order to Show Cause. Because Mr. Harris and his counsel's appeal is 
frivolous and malicious, this Court should also awarded Mrs. Harris 
double her costs and attorney's fees incurred in responding to this 
frivolous and malicious appeal, as provided in Rule 33(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June 2002. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Bonnie Harris 
-21-
IX 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of July 2002 I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the persons specified 
below by depositing a copy(s) in the United States Mail, Postage 
Prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Loren D. Martin 
MARTIN & NELSON 
139 South Temple, Suite 400 
SLC, UT 84111 
Charles Schultz 
Attorney for Bonnie Harris 
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JUDGMENT Mfr[ 
rN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DNN1E HARRIS 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPPLEMENTARY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 954402034DA 
Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16, 17 and September 23, 1999 
with a final hearing being held on October 12, 1999. Petitioner. Craig Harris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also 
present and was represented by J. Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing 
arguments on September 23, 1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including 
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the 
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney's fees until the October 12, 1999 
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and further 
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22, 
1999. The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January 
F YOTRTT NUMBER L 
26, 1999. The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and through 
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Court. 'I he Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and the Court having reviewed the evidence and the record, and being fully advised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Property Division 
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were SI 41,800.00 
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. 
2. The property shall be valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being 
January 26, 1999. 
3. The following deductions shall be subtracted from the Respondents premarital assets: 
a. 514,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; 
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26, 
1999. 
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are reduced to a total of $78,804.00. 
5. The total net divisible value of the estate at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered 
was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Schedule A. A copy of said Schedule A 
is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein. 
6. Included in this total value is Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a 
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value of $28,754 00 The Signetics retirement account is to be divided according to the formula 
stated in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties shall enter a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire 
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value 
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus 
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. 1 he total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
premarital assets of S141.800.00 for a total of $504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to 
Respondent is S362.957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court awards Petitioner the 
business, AID Equipment Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 
172 West 9400 South in Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is 
$147,533.00, and the value of the commercial building and Sot is $425,196.00. Therefore, 
Petitioner is awarded property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent is awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule 
A of Petitioner's Exhibit I prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the 
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. Therefore, 
Respondent is awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. Because the total value 
distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent is entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
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10. The Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) 1 bach party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter, with the exception of 
the Court's Order dated January 26, 1999, wherein the Court awarded Petitioner a reasonable 
attorney's fee for bringing the October 19, 1998, Order to Show Cause. 
12. The Petitioner^ counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's ft^ts totaling $5,711.48. 
however, pursuant to the Court's Findings, only 52,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's 
affidavit were related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court thus awards the Petitioner 
$2,564.16 in attorney's fees for the October 19, i 999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its 
January 26, 1999 Order. 
NORMAN LOEBBECKE FEES 
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17. 
14. Respondent is ordered to bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and separate 
obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22, 1999 in which the Court allowed 
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates. 
15. The Court orders that both parties shall equally bear the remaining fees of 
520,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is required to 
pay 512,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay $10,349.58. 
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the 
Court orders that the Petitioner be responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the 
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
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the property division 
17. The Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award of $2,564 16 
to Petitioner for attorney's fees and offset by SI 2,093.59 for her share of the Norman Loebbecke 
fees The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the 
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and personal property 
division as ordered by the Court. 
19. The Court orders that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner be stayed sixty 
(60) days after the entry of this Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the 
judgment. -
DATED t h i s ^ J a a v of November. 1999. 
RY THE/COURT: ^^JNH 
Approved as to Form: 
=s|liS 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Harris v. Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 
per Craig Ha/hs 
Proposed 
Distribution 
Description 
Net 
Value Bonnie Craig 
(Sash & Cash Equhalen/s 
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking 
Northwest Creait Un?on 7592 0 Savings 
Northwest Creait Union 7592 1 Checking 
Z,on's Bank 560-30939-5 Personal Checking 
Zlon's Bank 560-31378-5 Special Checking 
Sloth* and Bends 
hterWest Medical stock 
Retirement Accounts 
Dean Witter 124-100296 iRA Standard 
Dean Witter 179 039509 iRA Standard 
Prudential Securities OUQ-R6884G-41 Simple IRA 
Signetics Retirement* 
Life insurance 
MONY Wnoie Ufa 1347-24-19W 
New York Life 42594539 Term Life 
/ and/Residence 
House and Lot located at 692 S Jumper St, Pleasant Grove, UTB 
Commercial B'dg and House located at 172 W. 9400 SM Sandy, UT 
House and Lot located at 1328 N. Locust Lane, Provo, UT 
Building and Lot located at 725 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vernal, UT - 10 Acres, Uintah Ccunty Property 
Businesses 
AiD Equipment Company, Inc. 
Vehicle* 
1994 Ford Taurus GL 
1983 26' Komfort 5th Wheel Trailer 
1978 26' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Furniture/Furnishings/Appliance s 
Furniture and Personal Properly - Craig 
Jewelry 
Furniture and Personal Property - Bonnie 
Other Assets 
Gun reloading equipment 
Debts and Liabilities 
$ 1,090 $ 
1,279 
235 
554 
3 
554 
1,090 
1 279 
235 
3,161 
14.409 
14,409 
36,923 
48,918 
2.666 
28,754 
117,262 
16,042 
16,042 
103,591 
425,196 
46,443 
41,116 
28,053 
4,160 
648,559 
147,533 
147,533 
6.613 
3,100 
2.500 
12,213 
5,000 
2,200 
8.395 
15,595 
500 
500 
554 
48.918 
28,754 
77,672 
46.443 
4,160 
50,603 
6,613 
3,10Q 
9,713 
2,200 
4,198 
6,398 
2.607 
14,409 
14.409 
35,923 
2,666 
39,589 
16,042 
16,042 
103,591 
425,196 
41,116 
28.053 
597,956 
147,533 
147,533 
2.500 
2,500 
5^ 000 
4,198 
9,198 
500 
500 
i i 
Order to Show Cause February 14, 2001 
attempting to change the va1ues--we fre simply 
attempting to enforce what the Court ordered. 
With respect to Respondent's second 
argument that the Petitioner is not attempting-
where am I h e r e ? — R e s p o n d e n t is arguing that 
Petitioner is attempting to litigate the allege 
claims of non-parties to this action. That, 
again, is not the case. If that is in any way 
alleged in the documents, and I'm not sure it 
is, then I will withdraw that, because I 
completely understand. I actually came into th 
after the order to show cause had been filed. 
And if that's the case, I understand that 
argument. 
Again, what happened there, Your 
Honor, is that subsequent to the trial, after 
the trial, there was disagreement between the 
parties on what the Court actually ordered with 
respect to the personal property. Petitioner 
filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court 
heard the argument on March 1st. During that 
argument, the Court took a recess, gave the 
parties an opportunity to stipulate. They came 
back, they did reach a stipulation. That 
stipulation was read into the record. What the 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 905, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-983-2180 Toll Free: 877-441-8180 Fax:801-985-2181 
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stipulation--take what tools she wants and return 
the rest. And just as a side note, for no other 
reason than a side note, it should be noted that 
the insurance company has — they — a claims 
adjuster has come out and has filed a complaint 
against Ms. Harris for defrauding the insurance 
company, with respect to filing a claim for 
stolen property that wasn't actually stolen. I 
don't have anything for that — that's more of a 
side note than anything else. 
THE COURT: How do I know — the 
parties 1 stipulation on March 1, 2000, as to the 
disputed personal property, stated, on the 
personal property, Mrs. Harris will take what 
personal tools that she would like to have out 
of the shop by the 15th of March. Then the 
Petitioner will have until that weekend, I 
believe it's the 19th of March, to remove the 
rest of the possessions out of the shop, and 
then he will agree to pay $5,000 for the 
personal fproperty and he retains possession of 
all of the personal property. Now, how am I to 
know what items of personal property he had in 
the shop, which were part of the stipulation, 
and which he believes are in the Respondent's 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 905, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-985-2180 Toll FVee: 877-441-8180 Fax: 801-983-8181 
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police. That's with respect with the personal 
property. Now--
THE COURT: The interest--this whole 
case then is replete really with attempts to 
agree or agreements and--
MR. NELSON: It is. 
THE COURT: --problems. 
MR. NELSON: And I will state, on 
behalf of Craig, I do not want another 
evidentiary hearing. I do not want to call the 
insurance person here. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. NELSON: If we can get around that 
in any way possible, I think we've had enough 
evidentiary hearings. 
So, he didn't take the personal 
property, because, allegedly, it was stolen. Now, 
the $5,000 did include, as the order states, not 
only his personal things in the apartment or 
wherever it was he was living at the time, but 
also included some of the things in the shed. 
Was it all his personal property in the shed? 
No, absolutely not. That is exactly how all of 
his relatives have come into play in all this. 
There were bikes, four-wheelers, Aid Equipment 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 905, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-983-3180 Toll Free: 877-441-8180 Fix: 801-983-2181 
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possession? How do I come to that conclusion or 
make that determination, with that stipulation? 
MR. NELSON: Well, I agree. As I 
reviewed the record, there's nothing that 
establishes what was in the shop. 
THE COURT: That f s--
MR. NELSON: There's no list of 
anything, other than it seems to me that if — 
that that issue has been narrowed drastically b> 
the parties' stipulation that says she would ta) 
what tools she wants. It seems to me that if 
she would be able to take what tools she wants, 
she could take the tools, essentially agreeing 
that the rest then would go to Mr. Harris. 
THE COURT: Well, what is "the rest"? 
MR. NELSON: Oh, well again, there's 
nothing. It included some reload--gun reloadin< 
equipment, it included some fishing tackle, it 
included some — there was some shelving that Aid 
Equipment owned that they were storing there. 
Again, there's noting in evidence — I'm just 
telling you what my client has told me. And 
there was — there were some dirt bikes in there 
that were the boys'. I mean that's how the sons 
come into this. They're not coming in today, 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 905, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-983-2180 Toll Free: 877-441-8180 Fax: 801-983-3181 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
©} - f <T-0 ( «4uk_J 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICLCQLJRT
 D 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH P V 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
RULING 
Case No. 954402034 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on the Petitioner's Order to Show Cause and 
Respondent's Motion to Strike. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the parties' 
memoranda, heard oral arguments, and being fully advised in the premises issues the following: 
RULING 
The Court notes that some of the claims raised in Petitioner's Order to Show Cause are 
spurious and will be dealt with summarily. Petitioner would only be entitled to his own personal 
property kept in the storage unit (shop) in question. Yet, in addition to a claim for $4,600.00 for 
his own personal property, Petitioner prays for $23,000.00 of "items 'missing'" and for several 
thousand dollars for property alleged to belong to third parties. Petitioner has no standing to 
claim recovery for items belonging to relatives. Respondent is correct in asserting that affected 
individuals or business entities would have to file their own claims. 
Petitioner also makes claims against the IRA accounts awarded Respondent. The 
Supplementary Decree of Divorce stated, 
The property should be valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered 
being January 26, 1999. 
Petitioner cannot recover the difference in value between the time Respondent actually received 
the asset awarded and the value on January 26, 1999. Petitioner attacks the Order on Contempt 
Evidentiary Hearing stating that some of what Respondent was awarded came from separate 
retirement accounts set up after the divorce. Sentencing on Contempt was June 21, 2000. The 
Order regarding Contempt was filed July 17, 2000. Petitioner's position is not well taken. The 
time to attack that Order under Rules 59 and 60(b)(l)-(3) has passed. Petitioner's Order to Show 
Cause was filed over five months after the July Order. The Court notes that even had a proper 
challenge been filed, it would likely have failed. 
Petitioner makes fairness claims to seek recovery of part of the value of the life insurance 
policy and the retirement accounts. Petitioner's claim is really one of equity. Neither party comes 
before the Court with clean hands. Petitioner has been found to be in contempt. The Court 
declines to alter the awards as they stand based on equity. 
Each side has attacked the other's Motion for procedural flaws. As neither side has 
strictly complied with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Judicial Administration, 
the Court will not decide the matter solely on procedural grounds. 
The most troubling allegation the Court must deal with is the allegation that Petitioner did 
not receive items of his own personal property awarded by the stipulated agreement. The shop 
was awarded to Respondent. Some of its contents and other items of personal property were in 
dispute. The parties' stipulation March 1, 2000 as to disputed personal property stated, 
On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take what personal tools that she would 
like to have out of the shop by the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will 
have until that weekend, I believe it's the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the 
possessions out of the shop. . . . And then he will agree to pay $5000.00 for the 
personal property and he retains possession of all the personal property. 
The Order signed by the Court and filed on April 4, 2000, states, 
The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15, 2000 to 
select and remove what personal property she desires to have from the building 
located on the Pleasant Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the remaining 
personal property he desires out of the building on or before March 30, 2000. Any 
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personal property left in the building after March 30, 2000 shall be the property of 
the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the Respondent on or 
before April 4, 2000, for the personal property located in his personal possession 
and from the personal property received from the building located on the Pleasant 
Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot to the 
Petitioner from March 16, through March 30, 2000 upon the Petitioner giving 
Respondent 24 hour notice of the times in which he intends on removing the 
property. 
The language of the Order is very broad. Petitioner has failed to provide the Court with 
sufficient information to find that the Respondent did not comply with the Order. Specifically, 
the Court did not have before it a list of specific items from the shop belonging to Petitioner still 
in the possession of the Respondent and their values. Nor did Petitioner show that Respondent 
lacked the discretion under the Order to hold those items back. Petitioner did not desire another 
evidentiary hearing. The Court agrees that another hearing would be fruitless absent a limit to 
Respondent's discretion under the Order. 
The Court will not at this late date revalue the assets or reassess distribution. The Court 
notes the plethora of Orders it has had to enter since the initial Decree of Divorce. It is time to 
bring finality. Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted as to all matters except for claims for the 
Personal Property from the shed. Those personal property claims were not subject to a motion to 
strike, but failed after oral arguments. Therefore, Petitioner's Order to Show Cause is denied and 
Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Respondent's Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
2. Petitioner's Order to Show Cause is DENIED. 
3. Attorney fees are DENIED. 
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J Grant Moody, (6282) 
J GRANT MOODY, PC 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone. (801)756-4181 
Facsimile (801)756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, AFFIDAVIT OF JEANNE LANGSTON 
Petitioner, 
BONNIE HARRIS Civil No 954402034 DA 
Respondent Judge: Ray Harding, Jr 
STATE OF UTAH } 
SS 
COUNTY OF SEVERE } 
Jeanne Langston, being duly first sworn, deposes and states ae follows: 
1 I, Jeanne Langston, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. I am 
competent to testify as to these matters and would so testify if called upon to testify at 
trial of this matter. 
2. On November 13,1999.1 was staying with Bonnie Harris in Pleasant Grove for the 
weekend. 
3. Bonnie and I and another friend, Sharon Maxfield, were having breakfast at the K&V 
Restaurant in Pleasant Grove that monur.g, '.*.pp~f,v. 9:30 .im or ?0:0G uv] <vhen Craig 
Harris (Bonrae's X-husbaixf) came in and sat down and started talking with us. 
4 Craig made the comment that he was going to go to the shed and pick up one of their four 
wheelers to take out to the motor cycle race their grandson was in. 
5 Bonnie told Craig that she had the locks changed on the shed door and that she would 
have to let him in. 
6. At that point Craig got extremely mad He stated he would break the door down 
7 Bonnie said there was no reason for that, she would be glad to let him in, Craig made 
more threats and then left the restaurant. 
8. Sharon and I were going shopping Bonnie was going to the race track to watch her 
grandson race. However, Bonnie did not want to be left alone with Craig when he came 
to pick up the four whcclcr> and she asked me to stay with her until he left. 
9 Craig and his son Scot were not far behind us getting to Bonnie's house 
10 Craig said be had called Scot and told him to come and get his belongings out of the shed. 
! 1 Bonnie and I walked over to the shed to let Scot and Craig in 
12. Craig and Scot were mad, both Scot and Craig were extremely mde and ignorant in their 
talk and actions toward Bonnie. 
13 All that Bonnie said to them was. "I am not going to fight with any of you," "I have video 
taped everything in the shed, I have proof of what was in here, and we will have to let the 
Judge make another decision n Then Bonnie and I went back to her home 
14. We had not been there five minutes when Craig came to the door, Craig offered Bonnie 
$5,500 for his personal belonging and the reloading equipment. 
15, Bonnie said she felt it was worth more, that he had under evaluated everything. Craig 
was yelling and screaming threats at Bonnie. Craig ieft and returned a few minutes later 
with a different proposal $60,000 and he wouldn't mortgage the house that the Judge 
gave to Bonnie. 
16. Bonnie said she was not going to take his offer it was less than what the Judge had 
awarded her 
17. Craig was real mad and he made more threats Craig stated that if Bonnie did not take his 
offer he would keep fighting her in court until she used up all the money awarded to her. 
He said that she would spend it all in attorneys fees before he got through with her 
18. After about XA hour of his demands he left, because Bonnie would not give in and agree 
19 Bonnie repeatedly stated that she was not going to go against the Judges decision 
20. After Craig wr,n? back to the shed, Bonnie cal?*d Mr. Moody, her attorney, and asked 
what she should do. They discussed ail thai had happened. Mr. Moody aovised Bonnie 
to stay completely away from the shed until Cr*i? and Scot had left. 
21. At approx. 12:30 PM. Bonruc jaid shr was fuic ziri I should go wiih Sta/cit. 
22. As I left Bonnie's home, I could see Craig and Scot were still loading things into Scot's 
toidc s>id b&l hooked * boat onto Scot's trucic. 
23. I was gone until late afternoon (6:00 PM) and when I went back to Bonnie's she told me 
of M if&i-jeat thst had hipp^ied &. the rac? *nack. 
24. Bonnie stated that she had been standing 30 or 40 feet from Craig when Kara Harris, who 
is Scot's wife, rti!!ed up to the race track She did r-w :cc Bonn's ?ta.Vdns there when 
she started yelling to Craig " 1 got it, I got it, 1 did not steal it I just borrowed it, t did 
what you said and it worked I got in." Bonnie said that Craig hsd run *o the truck telling 
K.ija to Xorp quiet 
25. That same evening, Bonnie aiso let me hear Scot's message that he had left on her 
varming machine. Svct states after Boi:wc :iad locked *p the shed and has teft for the 
race he broke into the building to get his and Kara's Mt bikes, and that he had removed 
the devices Bonnie had put in (he door and put the door lever to keep the door from 
opening. 
26. The next day Bonnie, Ben McKinney and I wa'ked over to the shed We took long bolts 
and put two in each door lever, one on each side of the main beam and bolted them to the 
doors so that nobody would be sble to move or slide the lever and get into the shed. The 
doors were bolted shut at that time. 
27 Upon examining the main door, it was our beiief that it would be impossible to ever get it 
open using a credit card, it was tightly secured We left the building believing everything 
was secure. 
Dated this . day of Tnasizk' 2000. 
Jeanne Langston * 
Subscribed and Sworn to this _^L_day of ^AAV^C/ "" 2000. 
Notary JPublic 
Noumnuc i 
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STATE OF UTAH } 
.ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH } 
Bonnie Harris being first sworn on her oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1 I, Bonnie Harris, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit 
2. On November 13, 1999 1 was having breakfast with two of my friends Jeanie 
Langston and Sharon Maxfield. We were eating at K&V Restaurant in Pleasant Grove, when 
Craig Harris came and started talking to us 
3 Craig said he was going to the shed on Orchard Drive to get some things, including 
one of our four wheelers. 
4 I told Craig that I had changed the locks on the shed so he could not get in. Craig got 
very hostile and obnoxious and r>2:d he would bn*&k down the door. 
5 i toid him that there was no need to do that because I would let lam in the shed. 
6. Wh*r* Jeanie and 1 get back to my bou?e, Craig called and s?iri he caUed his son Scot 
and told him to get his stuff out of the shed 
7. Jeauie and I walked over to the s!icd to let Craig and Scoti into the shed. 
8. Craig anc Scot were very rude and obnoxious and Jeanie and I left and went back to 
my house. 
9. Craig came hacV. to the horse about ?.ve minute? later ami. v>ffere*l o ** 35,500.00 for 
his personal property and reloading equipment. 
! 0. I tO'Ci G aig thai the reloading equipment was worth more than that and that he had 
undervalued evfrv^hing. 
11. Craig was yelling and screaming at me and making ail sorts of threats. 
12. A ievv pumices later, Craig retaraec and offered mc $60,000.00 for everything and 
said that he would not mortgage the house if I a a ^ t e d $^0,000.00. 
13 1 told Craig that I would not accept his offer and that I was only ^oing to accept what 
the judge aw«ide»i me. 
14 Craig got even more angry and made more threats, and he told me that if I did not 
accept his offer he would keep fighting me in court until I spent everything in attorney's fees and 
that I would end up with nothing. He said he had plenty of money to pay his attorney but that I 
would have to spend everything the court gave me on attorney's fees to fight him 
Dated this ^6 <-iU day of January 200 i. 
Bonnie K. Harris 
Sworn and subscribed to thii *=2f day of January 2001. 
otary Public 
